Can Matt Goodwin's Childlessness Tax Force a Baby Boom?

In August 2023, political commentator and academic Matt Goodwin proposed introducing a "negative child benefit" tax on the childless as part of an argument about Britain's demographic decline.

This article assesses the proposal's assumptions and likely effects based on publicly available demographic data and comparative evidence.

Policy Test: The Case for a "Childless Tax"

In that Substack post titled "The Collapse of the British Family," Matt Goodwin included among a list of proposed measures the introduction of a tax on what he described as:

"Introducing a "negative child benefit" tax for those who don't have offspring."

The proposal appeared within a set of policy suggestions aimed at reversing what he characterised as a decline in family formation in Britain.

In subsequent writing and interviews, including a November 2024 post addressing Britain's fertility rate, Goodwin situates his proposal within a wider demographic argument. The rationale can be summarized as follows:

• Britain's total fertility rate remains below replacement level

• An ageing population places increasing long-term fiscal pressure on the state.

• Migration is presented as an insufficient long-term solution to demographic imbalance.

• The state should more actively incentivise family formation.

Within that framework, the "negative child benefit" tax functions as a pro-natalist policy instrument rather than as a standalone fiscal measure.

The Claim

The proposal Goodwin made in 2023 rests on three interlocking propositions:

1. That Britain's low birth rate is a serious long-term problem. With fewer children born and people living longer, the population will age rapidly, placing increasing pressure on pensions, healthcare, and the economy.

2. That immigration cannot fully solve this problem. Although migration can increase working-age population in the short term, Goodwin argues that migrants also age, fertility rates decline across generations, and relying on continued high inflows creates long-term instability. In his later writing, in November 2024, he also frames migration as something that alters the country's cultural and ethnic composition.

3. That the government should take stronger action to encourage people to have children, including through a "negative child benefit" tax on the childless. In his view, this would correct what he sees as an imbalance: parents bear the private costs of raising future taxpayers, while childless citizens benefit from the system those children will eventually support.

These propositions combine two types of claim.

The empirical (factual): whether Britain faces genuine demographic destabilisation, and whether migration materially changes that trajectory.

The normative (policy-based): whether introducing a financial penalty on childlessness would meaningfully increase birth rates and improve long-term economic and cultural stability.

The rest of this article examines these two overarching claims separately.

The Evidence

Before assessing whether Goodwin's proposal is supported by the evidence, it is necessary to examine the underlying demographic data.

The claims outlined above rest on a set of factual assumptions about ageing, family formation, fertility, and migration. These assumptions can be tested against national statistics.

The following section examines what the data actually shows.

It addresses four questions in turn and only once the evidence is examined can the policy implications be evaluated.

Is Britain facing demographic destablisation?

Britain's total fertility rate (TFR) is approximately 1.41 children per woman, the lowest sustained level on record.

Office of National Statistics (ONS) data also shows:

• The largest fertility decline has been found among women aged 25-29.

• Fertility among women ages 30-39 has risen relative to younger ages.

• The mean age of mothers is now approximately 31.0 years.

Longevity remains high and is projected to rise further:

• A boy born in 2023 is projected to live to 86.7 years on average.

• A girl born in 2023 is projected to live to 90.0 years.

• Survival to age 100 is increasing across projected cohorts.

Important points to note:

• Deaths have exceeded births in recent periods.

• Low fertility combined with rising longevity leads to population ageing.

• Old-age dependency ratio is projected to increase under current assumptions.

However, comparable fertility rates have been observed across most advanced economies.

• TFR across OECD countries declined sharply from 1970s onward, falling below replacement level in nearly all member states.

• By the early 2000s, TFR was below 2.1 in almost all OECD countries, except Mexico and Turkey, with some Southern European and East Asian countries reaching levels close to 1.3

• Postponement of childbirth is widespread across OECD member states and recuperation at later ages is only partial in most countries.

• Fertility rates in many OECD nations are unlikely to return to replacement levels if existing trends continue.

For more info on the OECD, see here.

Britain's fertility level, therefore, while historically low, sits within a clear broader pattern common to high-income industrial societies, rather than representing an isolated national anomaly.

Does low fertility reflect cultural collapse or structural conditions?

Marriage and partnership data show long-term change in family formation patterns.

Opposite-sex marriages have steadily declined since the 1970s, with the median age at marriage (2023) being:

• Men: 34.8 years

• Women 33.0 years

ONS also reports that women born in 1983 married later than those born in 1973, indicating cohort-level delay.

Structural indicators also include:

• Rising female higher education participation (56% of all students were female in 2024/25)

• Rising female labour market participation (72.5% of women ages 16-64 in employment Sept-Nov 2025, representing 16.7 million women in work).

• Deteriorating housing affordability relative to earnings (8 to 10 times median annual earnings, which is substantially higher than ratios observed in the 1990s).

• High childcare costs relative to income (In 2024, the median hourly parent-paid fee was £6.00 per hour for childcare, meaning it cost on average of £12,000 to £15,000 per year per child).

The fertility decline is concentrated in delayed first births, particularly among women in their late twenties.

If the concern is framed in terms of ethnic continuity, Census 2021 data shows that 81.7% of usual residents in England and Wales identified as White, down from 86% in 2011.

The change is uneven regionally: 36.8% identified as White British in London, compared with 90.6% in both the North East and Wales.

Around 32% of births are to non-UK-born mothers. However, Census data also shows that large proportions of minority ethnic populations are UK-born, indicating generational settlement rather than solely recent migration.

National identity data further shows that large shares of of people across all major ethnic groups identify as British.

The data therefore confirms demographic diversification and long-term structural change. They do not, in themselves, measure cultural cohesion, vitality, or decline.

Would financial penalties increase fertility?

Goodwin's proposal assumes fertility is sufficiently responsive to financial pressure that a tax penalty on childlessness would increase birth rates.

Cross-national evidence suggests there are limits to that assumption, with OECD data showing the average TFR across member states was 1.43 in 2023, with all but one country below replacement level (2.1).

Many OECD countries already operate extensive family policy regimes, including:

• Child allowances

• Tax credits

• Subsidised childcare

• Parental leave.

Public spending on family benefits averages around 2.35% of GDP across the OECD, and exceeds 3% in several countries.

Despite substantial financial support for families across advanced economies, no OECD country that entered sustained sub-replacement fertility after the 1970s has returned to and maintained replacement-level fertility (around 2.1) over a prolonged period.

More intensive pro-natalist regime provide additional context here.

• Hungary introduced substantial tax exemptions and direct financial incentives for families with multiple children.

• South Korea has expanded public spending on childcare and family benefits dramatically over the past 20 years.

Despite these endeavours, both countries remain below replacement fertility, with South Korea recording one of the lowest fertility rates in the OECD.

No contemporary liberal democracy operates a direct tax penalty on childlessness.

Historical examples of coercive pronatalist policies (like Romania in the 1960s and 1970s) did achieve temporary increases in births. The consequences to this boost included significant social and ethical consequences and the rise in fertility eventually fell once again.

Can migration sustainably offset low fertility?

Net migration has fluctuated significantly in recent years, reaching historically high levels before falling sharply more recently.

• March 2023 = net migration reached approximately 944,000.

• June 2025 = net migration fell to around 204,000.

ONS data shows that the vast majority of migrants are of working age (16-64), meaning that migration can temporarily slow population ageing.

This inflow increases the proportion of working-age adults and improves the worker-to-retiree ratio in the short term.

However:

• Migrants also age over time

As migrant cohorts grow older, they eventually contribute to the older population, resulting in migration delaying rather than preventing population ageing.

• Fertility rates of foreign-born women are higher than UK-born women, but remain below replacement overall

Migration increases the number of births primarily by increasing the number of women of childbearing age. It does not restore replacement-level fertility per woman.

Second-generation migrants typically exhibit fertility patterns closer to the UK average, reducing long-term differences.

2023 data shows that:

• 31.8% of live births were to non-UK-born mothers

• 37.3% involved at least one non-UK-born parent.

These births contribute to population growth and slightly improve the age structure, but they do not permanently alter fertility trends.

Migration therefore influences population composition and can moderate ageing. It is currently the primary driver of UK population growth, as natural change (births minus deaths) has declined in recent years.

It does not, on current levels, restore replacement fertility nationally.

Sustaining a stable age structure through migration alone would require consistently high inflows over long periods, as each migrant cohort also ages over time.

The Implications

The evidence presented above establishes the demographic trends underlying the proposal. The question that follows is not whether demographic change exists, but whether the specific policy mechanism proposed logically follows from that evidence.

The proposed "negative child benefit" tax rests on assumptions about how fertility decisions respond to economic incentives and the extent to which policy can alter demographic trajectories.

Assessing its plausibility therefore requires examining whether these assumptions are supported by demographic data and comparative evidence from other advanced economies.

Policy Assumption 1: Fertility responds strongly to financial penalties

The proposal assumes:

• A tax on people without children would encourage more people to have children and increase birth rates.

Available evidence indicates:

• OECD data shows that even with generous financial support (tax credits, child allowances and subsidised childcare) has only led to small and often temporary increases in birth rates. No advanced economy has successfully returned to long-term replacement-level fertility after it has declined.

Implication:

• This suggests that decisions about having children are influenced more broadly by economic and social conditions (housing, income stability and family formation) than by tax changes alone. A financial penalty on childlessness would therefore be unlikely to significantly increase national birth rates.

Policy Assumption 2: Britain's fertility decline is a uniquely national problem

The proposal assumes:

• Britain's falling birth rate reflects a specific national decline that requires immediate policy intervention.

Available evidence indicates:

Fertility rates have declined across almost all developed countries over several decades. Britain's fertility rate, while historically low, is similar to levels seen across other high-income societies.

Implication:

• This suggests that population ageing is part of a wide global trend that is linked to economic development and social change, rather than a problem caused by uniquely British conditions.

Policy Assumption 3: Migration cannot significantly reduce population ageing

The proposal assumes:

• Migration provides only short-term relief and does not sustainably affect long-term demographic trends.

Available evidence indicates:

• ONS data shows that most migrants are of working age, which helps slow population ageing in the short term. However, migrants also grow older over time, and fertility rates among migrant populations tend to move closer to national averages across generations.

Implication:

• Migration can help reduce the speed of population ageing, but it does not completely reverse it. This suggests that no single policy, including migration alone, can fully resolve demographic ageing.

Policy Assumption 4: Redistributing income toward parents improves demographic stability

The proposal assumes:

• Transferring financial resources from people without children to those with children would improve long-term demographic stability.

Available evidence indicates:

• Evidence from OECD countries shows that financial support for families has not consistently resulted in sustained increases in birth rates.

Implication:

• This suggests that while such policies may change how resources are distributed, their ability to significantly alter long-term demographic trends is uncertain.

Can a Childlessness Tax Force a Baby Boom?

The evidence shows that Britain's birth rate has fallen and the population is ageing. This is a real trend and it is happening across most developed countries, not just Britain. These changes will have long-term effects on the economy and public services.

However, the evidence also shows that financial policies alone have limited power to increase birth rates. Even countries that provide generous financial support to families have not been able to return to long-term replacement-level fertility.

Decisions about having children appear to be influenced more by factors such as housing costs, job security, and family stability than by a tax policy alone.

Based on available demographic data, there is limited evidence that a childlessness tax would force a sustained baby boom and Britain's low birth rate reflects long-term structural change, not sudden danger.

This analysis draws on data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS, OECD demographic databases, UK Census 2021, and publicly available policy proposals and commentary by Matt Goodwin.